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posits that cosmopolitan communications—reflected in “the channels that in-
creasingly bind people living in diverse communities and nation-states together”
(p. 8)—have individual-level effects that aremoderated by several factors.Macro-
level factors (or firewalls) include the level of media freedom that exists in a par-
ticular nation-state, the external barriers to trade integration, levels of poverty,
and access to communication technologies. Coupled with individual-level fire-
walls, such as how much citizens learn from the media, these factors condition
the extent to which cultural exports (primarily from the global North) can un-
dermine cultural diversity.
Particularly impressive aboutCosmopolitan Communications is the authorsʼ
array of criterion variables. Recognizing how other scholars have conceptualized
and operationalizedmedia impact, Norris and Inglehart focus on several key con-
sequences of such media content—the extent to which citizens hold nationalistic
identities and trust outsiders; their attitudes regarding individual success as well as
conservative economic attitudes; social and moral values related to sexuality, re-
ligion, gender, and family; and citizensʼ level of civic engagement. Research on
each of these criterion values can fill volumes, and Norris and Inglehart adroitly
distill thework of key players to present an easily digestible account of the extant
literature. Naturally, their focus is driven by their working with secondary data
from the World Values Surveys. The authors link these data to indices con-
structed from a plethora of other sources, including the Freedom House, the
World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme.
As with any undertaking that involves extensive comparisons over space
and time, Cosmopolitan Communications does not allow for detailed contrasts
to be made—nor should readers expect them. The bookʼs argument simply is not
designed with any particular country in mind, although the authors have included
numerous rich examples that serve to illustrate a particular point. Readers, how-
ever, should anticipate skillful theoretical and analytical meshing of levels of anal-
ysis. Norris and Inglehart easily succeed on this front. Despite the spate of data on
which their argument rests, the authors provide sufficient caveats to their research
that allow future researchers to follow up in specific research areas. Norris and
Inglehart are to be commended not only for integrating arguments fromanumber
of disciplines, but also for returning to the very serious normative concerns and
practical implications related to cultural diversity around the globe.
PATRICIA MOY
University of Washington
TheDynamics of Two-Party Politics: Party Structures and theManagement
of Competition by AlanWare. New York, Oxford University Press, 2009.
176 pp. $60.00.
Alan Ware turns the focus on two often-overlooked factors in prevailing
models of party systems: the agency of the party leaders and the structure
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of party organization. Those factors can best be seen on the boundaries of
two-party politics. Ware focuses first on the cases in which one of two major
parties is on the brink of collapse, and second, on the cases in which a minor
party is on the brink of joining with one of the two major parties.
Major parties do not fail as often as one might think. Ware attributes
much of this to their position as a major party, and thus as the primary focal
point for any opposition to the party in power. But when parties do suffer
major defeats, they may not always be able to fight their way back, especially
if they are sandwiched between two foes. This attention to the prospect of
failure is critical to understanding a two-party system, because the ability
for even a critically wounded party to rebound is part of what maintains a
two-party equilibrium.
Minor parties do not merge as often as one might think, either. And atten-
tion to this is equally critical to our understanding. The logic of coalition build-
ing that drives a party system to have two parties should mean that small
parties would be absorbed easily. Here, much of the action is with the bar-
gaining incentives between a major party and a minor party—more nimble
perhaps, but with fewer voters. The book thus sharpens another frontier in
the maintenance of the two-party equilibrium. Indeed, still more focus in this
area might highlight the forces that keep small parties in check even when
they do not fuse with the major parties, and so maintain the existence of the
two-party system.
But that is not this bookʼs purpose. The book instead seeks to understand
how party leaders work within a two-party system as much as how they create
it. A more serious omission is at this level. Like much of party scholarship, this
book reduces the actors to party actors and voters. All the relevant dynamics
then, are within parties, between parties, or between parties and voters. There
is little room for outside agents, be they interest groups, intellectuals, jour-
nalists, or activists. This last omission is especially notable. A growing litera-
ture has highlighted the role of activists in pulling parties away from their
constituentsʼ preferences. Where activists are present in Wareʼs account, they
are either a wing of the party or a faction among voters, and sometimes it is not
clear which.
It may be that activists have the same role whether one thinks of them as
part of the party or outside it. But identifying them could highlight key ele-
ments of Wareʼs thesis. For instance, the structure of the organization might
be more or less open to outside influence or more or less capable of co-opting
activist demands. And of course, the agency of official party leaders take place
alongside the agency of extra-party activists. When parties suffer catastrophic
defeats, their survival surely also depends on whether other minor parties suc-
cessfully seize the opportunity, or whether activists choose to continue to work
with the former major party or switch to a new one.
This is hardly a fatal flaw. Indeed, there is good reason to conceptualize
activists as members of the party with which they are aligned. The focus of
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the book is elsewhere. That there are so many questions remaining after read-
ing it highlights the fruitfulness of the approach taken.
HANS NOEL
University of Michigan and Georgetown University
Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public by Jennifer
Merolla and Elizabeth Zechmeister. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago
Press, 2009. 280 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $25.00.
Jennifer Merolla and Elizabeth Zechmeister contend that citizens cope
with a terrorist crisis in three ways—increased authoritarian attitudes, as-
signing leadership qualities to those in power (as opposed to bringing
strong leaders to power), and preferring foreign policies that engage threats
abroad—and these responses potentially put democracies at risk. The
authors devote a chapter to each coping mechanism, which provide survey
and experimental data to illustrate that people do respond to terrorist crises
as the authors suggest.
The book is well written and interesting, but suffers from three significant
weaknesses. The first is that the scope condition of terrorist crises appears
somehow both too broad and too narrow. Although the authors emphasize ter-
rorism, many of their findings should be applicable to other types of crises (for
example, surprise attacks by foreign states, military stand-offs short of war, the
assassination of a leader). Some of their experiments do distinguish between
terrorist and economic crises, but certain national security crises can pose a
greater threat to the existence of the state and the lives of its people. At the
same time, it is unclear that their argument is even applicable to most terrorist
events. Their evidence relies heavily on surveys and experiments conducted
after September 11, but that event is so unique in the history of terrorism that
relying on it so heavily weakens the generalizability of the authorsʼ arguments.
One is left wondering how the coping mechanisms differ between a single,
destructive incident like September 11 compared to a sustained terrorist
campaign, as experienced by the British, Israelis, or Colombians.
Second, not only should the nature of the attack matter, but I would expect
very different public responses, depending on the perpetrators. September 11
was carried out by foreign citizens in the name of a religious organization that
declared war on the West. Should we expect the same coping mechanisms in
response to attacks by, for example, the Animal Liberation Front, a single-
issue group made up of American citizens, which seeks to avoid injuries?
Logically, at least one mechanism—focusing on foreign engagements—should
be more prevalent if the perpetrators are citizens of a foreign state. But what if
they are citizens of the state, as with Timothy McVeighʼs attack in Oklahoma
City? Likewise, what if the government engineers the crisis, such as during
a campaign of state terror (for example, Argentinaʼs Dirty War)? Should we
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